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Abstract 
	  
Globalization is a complex and constantly changing phenomenon shaping our contemporary 
world and societies. It is argued to generate economic growth and greater possibilities to most 
people in the world, but has an impact on an individual level as well, on our personal values 
and social attitudes. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the research done within the field 
of globalization and how it affects people’s attitudes towards foreign people and culture. This 
research area is today filled with diverse arguments, conclusions and theories about this 
complicated relation. Our quantitative study on globalization and xenophobic attitudes in 
European countries during the last decades examines whether different dimensions of the 
globalization, i.e. social and economic, affect xenophobic attitudes in different ways.  
 
Approached from a theoretical framework of four hypotheses suggesting how globalization 
affect people’s reaction on increased flows of foreign people and culture, our study states that 
both social and economic globalization have a relation to the level of xenophobia in a state. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that social globalization foster tolerance towards what is 
foreign while negative changes in economic globalization may increase xenophobic attitudes.  
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1. Introduction 
	  
Globalization is one of the main concepts used to explain the contemporary situation of our 
world. International political cooperation, free trade agreements and integration of different 
cultures are all processes often prioritized on states’ political agenda. This phenomenon is 
dominant on a global as well as on a national and individual level. It shapes most individual’s 
lives on an everyday basis and is often seen as mainly positive, something that generates 
possibilities and economic wealth. Nevertheless, there are also negative aspects of this 
process discussed on the political and societal arena, such as inequality and changes in social 
attitudes. Another topic that has been highly debated on the European political agenda the last 
decade is the rise of xenophobic and racist parties and movements. The simultaneous 
emergence of both phenomena makes us wonder whether the increase of xenophobic attitudes 
might be one of these negative aspects of globalization.  
 
Previous research has treated the field of the globalization’s consequences, and more 
specifically the topic on how it affects people’s attitudes towards the growing flow of foreign 
people, culture and structures. Still, the conclusions are many and the only consensus reached 
so far is that the globalization is a very complex phenomenon. If one divides the general 
concept of globalization into three more concrete dimensions, political-, economic-, and 
social globalization, more aspects of the relationship between xenophobia and globalization 
can be studied. They all come hand in hand, but do they affect our mindset and attitudes in 
different ways?  Can the development of xenophobic attitudes be a rational action of a risk 
averse individual whose personal or national identity feel threatened by the growing flow of 
foreign people and culture, or rather rational action due to a situation of economic recession?  
 
The increase of xenophobia in Europe the last couple of years can be considered distant or 
non-influential to some people, but if it continues to grow and takes place in policy-making 
on a national level it will probably affect many people’s lives. To prevent a development like 
this, more research in the area is needed to create a deeper understanding of these phenomena 
shaping our contemporary world and individual lives. 
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1.1.1 Study objective  
The aim of this study is to contribute to the research done within the field of globalization 
and social attitudes. Globalization and the increasing xenophobia, as well as other far-right 
ideologies, and the relationships between them have been frequently studied the last years. 
The majority of these studies are qualitative studies of xenophobia in specific countries, or 
studies based on the level of globalization. We are interested in examining the difference in 
globalization over periods, both aggregated and divided in the sub-categories economic- and 
social globalization, and if there is any correlation between any of these differences and the 
rise of xenophobia in European countries during the last decades.   
 
 It is not our intention to study what the main cause of xenophobia is, but the analysis and 
result of our own study do touch this topic. Our results and discussion do treat and support 
different perspectives and theories on the primary cause to xenophobia attitudes, but it is, 
however, rather our intention to study whether different dimensions of the globalization is a 
mechanism in this process and affect the possible causes of xenophobic attitudes. 
	  
1.1.2 Research question  
With a breeding ground in the field presented above, and our objective to this study, we have 
formulated the following questions to answer: Does the difference in the globalization level 
have an impact on people’s attitudes towards foreigners and their culture? More specifically, 
can differences in social and economic globalization tell us something about the increase of 
xenophobia in Europe the last decade?  
	  
	  
1.2 How do we answer the question? 
	  
To approach this problem and our research question, we bring forward and compare both 
empirical situations and theory concerning xenophobia with previous research on the growing 
globalization and its consequences. Based on this theoretical discussion we formulate four 
hypotheses used as guidelines throughout the analysis. Our contribution to this research area 
is our own study with focus on the difference in globalization and how this might have a 
relation to the increasing xenophobic attitudes in Europe. We make quantitative regressions 
on 30 countries in Europe in the period of 1990 to 2010. Since we examine the 
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globalization’s impact on xenophobia, the level of xenophobia is our dependent variable, and 
it is analyzed with the independent variable difference in globalization and a number of 
control variables. The results are analyzed based on a theoretical framework about 
xenophobic attitudes and the different dimensions of globalization.  
	  
	  
1.3 Disposition 
	  
After this short presentation of our research question and our approach to this problem, 
chapter 2 gives a brief background to the progress and situation of the two phenomena 
globalization and rise of xenophobia in Europe, as well as our definition of the concepts. 
Thereafter a theoretical discussion analyzes relevant theory on why xenophobia occurs, 
present earlier research in the field and our hypotheses. In chapter 3 we present our 
contribution to the field, the method and results of our study. The result is then compared to 
earlier studies and analyzed within a relevant context. In chapter 4 we summarize the paper 
and give our conclusion. 
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2. Empirical background and theoretical 
framework  
	  
In this chapter we give a brief introduction to the situation of the two phenomena in focus of 
our study, globalization and xenophobia. Our definition of the phenomena and how we use 
the terms throughout the paper is presented. After a review of the empirical situation we first 
discuss the theoretical framework of xenophobia briefly and thereafter theory and previous 
research concerning the relationship between xenophobic attitudes and globalization.  
	  
	  
2.1 Current situation  
	  
2.1.1 Era of globalization  
Our contemporary time is sometimes called “the era of globalization”. Globalization is often 
referred to as a global merger of economic and political systems and structures. Research 
about the phenomenon can be divided into macro-level development, such as economic and 
political changes, and a lower micro-level of individual- and cultural attitudes and changes. 
(De Burgh-Woodman 2014, p. 289ff) 
	  
The increasing globalization has one instant effect. Different cultures and people interact 
more frequently than earlier, political and economic systems change and what once was 
foreign and far away is now your neighbor or a vital part of the social structure where you 
live. The Eurobarometer, the Public Opinion Analysis sector of the European Commission, 
shows that the experienced benefit of globalization is not only positive (Eurobarometer 2013, 
p.111). In their survey just over 50% of the participants in the survey 2013 agreed on the 
statement that globalization is an opportunity to economic growth. This indicates on 
skepticism towards globalization on an individual level, which creates a further motive to our 
study.  
	  
As stated above, globalization is a very broad and complex phenomenon and therefore often 
divided into the subcategories social-, political, and economic globalization. These categories 
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include different parts of the society, but come hand in hand. This is a division we use in this 
paper to explain more easily what part of the globalization is intended. When all categories 
are used as one general concept it is phrased as aggregated globalization. 
	  
2.1.2 Rise of xenophobia 
Racism, xenophobia and right wing movements are growing in Europe. Cultural differences, 
multiculturalism and immigration are political topics which have become more popular in 
many European countries (Evens Foundation 2002, editorial preface). In 2010 approximately 
half of the European Union countries had a xenophobic and/or racist party in their parliament, 
and in the last years these kinds of parties have been represented in the European parliament 
(Bjurwald 2010, p.3).  
	  
Xenophobia and racism are often seen as synonyms, but there are theoretical differences 
between the expressions. According to the Oxford Dictionaries xenophobia is “Intense or 
irrational dislike or fear of people from other countries”, while racism is “The belief that all 
members of each race possess characteristics, abilities, or qualities specific to that race, 
especially so as to distinguish it as inferior or superior to another race or races”. The racial 
focus, which racism is built on, is not a part of xenophobia. Instead it is focused on cultural 
differences, such as religion and language, and the fear that another culture may undermine 
one’s own (Migrationsinfo 2012). According to Stephen Castles, professor in Sociology at 
the University of Sydney, racism is a changing phenomenon that today is more focused on 
cultural and social identity (Castles 2000, p.164, 179). This definition by Castles makes the 
difference between xenophobia and racism even more vague and harder to define.  
	  
Similarly, nationalism is closely related to the two ideologies as it is also focused on one’s 
own nation and its superiority of others (Oxford Dictionaries 2014). The close relationship 
between the three ideologies makes it sometimes difficult to define the difference. From this 
point we only use the term xenophobia, but it often include racism, Nazism and nationalism 
where xenophobic attitudes are expressed. In section 3.2.2 a more specific description of our 
criteria for a xenophobic party and how we measure it is presented. 
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2.2 Theoretical perspectives 
	  
People are well aware of the increasing stream of people, increasing trade flows and 
worldwide integration of culture due to the social globalization and how it affect our 
everyday life. But does the social and/or economic globalization affect attitudes towards 
these new foreign citizens and their appearance as well? Three main questions structure the 
theoretical discussion. Firstly, why do xenophobic attitudes occur? Secondly, which are the 
possible reactions on the growing stream of foreign people and culture, and thirdly, do 
different dimensions of globalization affect these reactions? The discussion concerning the 
second and third question emerges into our four hypotheses on possible outcomes. Last in 
this section previous research are discussed.  
	  
2.2.1 Why do some people fear the foreign? 
As the previous section 2.1.2 stated, we define xenophobia as a broad concept including both 
racism, Nazism and in some cases nationalism. A brief presentation on two main theories 
explaining the causes of xenophobia is given, which thereafter proceeds to a discussion 
connected to globalization. The two perspectives are the economic materialistic “scapegoat 
theory” and the social and more idealistic “social identity theory”. This division of 
perspectives explaining xenophobia is used in other research from different fields on 
xenophobia and immigrant attitudes (see Hopkins & Hainmueller 2013 and Sides & Citrin 
20071).  
 
The scapegoat theory simply suggest a relation between negative events occurring in a 
society, such as economic recession and social ill, and citizens’ negative attitudes towards 
foreigners (all categories put together: asylum seekers, immigrants, workers etc.) (Alarape 
2008, p. 77ff). The basic logic behind this theory is that people simply blame foreigners for 
causing social ill, stealing their jobs and making economic crisis even worse. Foreigners are 
simply turned into a scapegoat which people can blame their misfortune (ibid). This process 
is also called “externalization of internal conflicts” (Rärthzel 2002, p. 18f), and it is argued 
that this externalization of internal conflicts is an unconscious mechanism of individuals, 
furthermore a political process used to gain control and power. Migration rules as example is 
covering problem areas in the society that policy making can control, not like the free market 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Both these studies are commented in a later stage.	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and the economic liberalization where the states in Europe have less impact on national 
politics due to the European Union (ibid). 
	  
The theory focusing on social identity approaches this problematic topic differently. It 
suggests that xenophobia is a result of individual values and social norms where people tend 
to divide citizens into groups. The first group includes oneself, family and friends. Since 
people think good about oneself, this group is given all positive qualities while the “other 
group” is given bad qualities. The other group is often foreigners who suffer from being 
(often arbitrary) categorized with negative features as a result of the other citizens attempt to 
increase their self-esteem and qualities. (Alarape 2008, p. 79ff) 
	  
The social identity theory is originally based on an individual level, but can also be applied on 
a national level (Ariely 2012, p.462f). The threats from outside are then believed to destroy 
the nation and its traditions.  
	  
2.2.2 Possible reactions on the increasing level of immigrants and foreign 
culture 
To put the two basic views on causes to xenophobic attitudes in a context of the growing 
globalization discussed above, we now examine if and how the difference in the dimensions 
of globalization affects xenophobia. Social globalization, which includes flows of people as 
well as cultural factors, has in general grown over the last time in Europe (Dreher a 2006) as 
well as the net migration share (World Bank a). Irrespective of the actual causes of 
xenophobia, but grounded in the differences in the dimensions of globalization, how does 
people’s attitudes towards foreign people and culture change?    
	  
In a situation of a continuously growing global movement of people, culture and ideas, we 
can directly consider two alternative outcomes of attitudes towards the foreign flow.  The first 
perspective implies that individuals do not see a risk that an increasing interaction, integration 
or coexistence with foreign people would lead something bad. Instead it proposes that the 
results are deeper understanding of other cultures and more tolerance towards the “others”. 
People get to know the foreign, understand unknown traditions and simply learn to coexist 
and accept differences between each other. The second perspective proposes the opposite 
reaction and assumes that individuals are risk averse. It suggests that more interaction and 
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mixture of cultures increase fear of the foreign and therefore xenophobic attitudes. With other 
words the two perspectives state the immigration and global streams of social and cultural 
exchange to result in more or less xenophobia. Other researcher discusses this reasoning as 
well, “Different theories predict that greater day-to-day contact with immigrants may either 
increase or decrease the perceived threat posed by immigrants“(Card, Dustmann & Preston 
2005, p.21). What interests us is whether globalization affects this process in any direction, 
and if the different dimensions of globalization are mechanisms in this process affecting 
differently.  
 
Dividing the general concept of globalization into the more specific dimensions gives an 
opportunity to examine the two outcomes of how citizens react on immigration closer in a 
context of globalization. As noted, globalization has brought increasing trade and growing 
GDP for most countries in the world. Since the dimension of economic globalization is built 
on economic indicators and is therefore affected by the state’s economic situation, we find it 
closely related to people’s materialistic preferences and the scapegoat theory. In a similar way 
we consider the social globalization connected to the social identity theory. As example, the 
social globalization is affected by the number of immigrants in a state, which in turn may 
affect people’s attitudes towards immigrants. When we put the two possible outcomes of 
reactions to the increasing foreign flow discussed above in the context of social and economic 
globalization, four hypotheses can be derived from this theoretical approach. 
	  
The first hypothesis states that both social and economic globalization is correlated with 
xenophobia. This result supports a relationship between globalization and xenophobia, but 
since we use the difference in globalization, support for the different theories depends on 
whether the relationship is positive or negative. 
	  
The second hypothesis states that none of the dimensions correlate with the level of 
xenophobia. This simply indicates that globalization in itself is not a mechanism affecting 
xenophobia, and it would not support or reject any of the theories of what causes xenophobia.  
	  
The third hypothesis applies that if there is a strong and positive relationship between 
xenophobia and social globalization but not between xenophobia and economic globalization. 
This would indicate that actual face-to-face interaction with the foreign creates more fear 
towards the “others” than it creates understanding and a development towards a well-
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functioning multicultural society at the same time as attitudes due to economic globalization 
is unchanged.  The theory of social identity as a cause to xenophobic attitudes would then be 
supported.  
	  
The fourth hypothesis applies if there is a negative relation between economic globalization 
and xenophobia, but no relationship between social globalization and xenophobia. This 
would support the scapegoat theory, that negative changes in the global economy make 
people blame the foreign. 
 
Before we present the results of our own study and analyze it within the theoretical 
framework and the four possible hypotheses, we discuss what previous research has 
examined and concluded. 
	  
2.2.3 What can previous research teach us?  
Globalization and its consequences have been frequently studied the last decades. The 
approaches are many, as are the results. Here only a small amount of available studies and 
reports relevant for our approach are discussed. In focus is the authors’ argumentation on 
how globalization and its different dimensions have affected xenophobic attitudes and we 
give our own interpretation on how this can be related to the main perspectives of what 
causes xenophobia in the first place. 
 
In 1990 the global migration grew and became larger than ever before. This migration flow 
started and is proceeding hand in hand with the globalization shaping our modern time, and 
has been increasing since. According to scholar Charles Westin this process has brought 
complications to the well-functioning democracies in Europe. States have many tasks to 
manage, such as national and social welfare, education and secure jobs, and the globalization 
with its increasing migration and new cultures, ideas etc. threatens this work. The result is 
two types of political policies working against each other, support for multiculturalism and 
immigration control policies. (Westin 2001, p.6ff) 
 
Further Westin concludes, “These developments have triggered new forms of social conflict 
and exclusion. The new right in Europe is seen as a reaction to globalization and 
multiculturalism” (Westin 2001, p. 9). The conclusion that globalization do affect people's 
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attitudes and their social behavior is shared by most scholars, and another study examining 
the relation between globalization and xenophobia states that it is possible that globalization 
affect us in different ways. It can make us more positive or negative to immigrants (Ariley 
2011, p.542ff). This statement is built on a discussion of previous studies stating divided 
results on how globalization affects people. The main conclusion of this study is that a state 
with high level of globalization has a higher level of xenophobic attitudes (Ariely 2011, p. 
550). 
 
Stephen Castles, mentioned in section 2.1.2, agree and states that there is a relationship 
between globalization and the rise of racism and xenophobia. He argues that globalization 
may lead to societal changes that affect the national economy, politics and social relations. 
These changes express themselves through different kind of crises that can cause xenophobia. 
One of the crises is about culture and social identity. Globalization has led to that big parts of 
today’s culture, such as music and films, are produced in global cultural cities as Los 
Angeles. This creates a feeling of loss for the national culture, such as languages, and may be 
a cause to the rise of nationalistic and xenophobic views focusing on the cultural aspects. 
Fear that other cultures may undermine one’s own is another suggested cause to xenophobia 
that Castles brings up. This fear creates an opposition towards immigrants who bring their 
own cultures and languages with them. Another crisis Castles brings up is formed when 
companies move the production to low-wage countries and then create unemployment, 
especially in industrial sectors. This increase in unemployment, especially during the 1970th 
may, according to Castles, have for example resulted in former workers blaming foreigners 
for stealing their jobs. (Castles 2000, p.180ff) 
 
Our interpretation of Castles’ discussion on the crisis is that they are pointing in two different 
directions. The first crisis mentioned, about the loss of cultural heritage, can be related to the 
social identity theory and that foreign cultures are considered a threat. The second crisis is 
more related to the scapegoat theory. Castles argues that unemployment, primarily among 
industrial workers, is a cause to xenophobia and this is consistent with the scapegoat 
theory.  On the other side, some scholars argue that the theories suggesting economic ill and 
labor market competition have no empirical support (Hainmueller & Hopkins 2013, p.17f). 
 
In a research paper called “Why are people more pro-trade than pro-migration?” (Mayda 
2006), it is argued that people’s attitudes in general are more pro-trade than pro-migration. 
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The two variables trade and migration correlate positively with each other, but an increasing 
trade is generally preferred to an increasing migration. Concluded from the study’s 
regressions, it is further stated that people working in non-trade related sectors are generally 
more positive to trade than immigration than people working in trade-related sectors. It is 
suggested that this is because people not working in the trade sector is not familiar with this 
sector and its dependence of cooperation and exchange with foreigners, and that they 
therefore feel threatened by immigrants to take their jobs. (Mayda 2006, p.3ff) 
 
That people in general are more positive to trade than migration could indicate on what has 
been said before, that economic globalization, where trade is a vital part, is generally 
considered to bring economic growth and wealth while immigration is sometimes considered 
to bring negative aspects such as a threat on the labor market or a threat to a nation’s culture 
as well. This argumentation supports the scapegoat theory in the way that foreigners are 
blamed to steal jobs. Another reason to the results could be that the people working in the 
trade sectors learn to understand foreigners and different cultures and thereby create tolerance 
leading to a more positive attitude towards immigration. 
 
Another recent study investigating the relation between globalization and tolerance (Berggren 
& Nilsson 2014) supports the theoretical perspective stating that more globalization leads to 
more positive attitudes towards the foreign due to an increasing tolerance. The study finds 
that social and economic, but not political, globalization has a positive relationship with 
people’s willingness to teach their children to be tolerant (p.28f). They conclude that some 
parts of the globalization do shape our values and attitudes in positive ways. Our 
interpretation of this result is that interaction with other cultures does not create fear but 
tolerance, which in turn reject the social identity theory. 
	  
Another interesting approach to how globalization affects xenophobia in Europe is to divide 
it into east and west, as Greskovits does in “Economic globalization and racism in Eastern 
and Western Europe” (2002). This due to that globalization has developed differently in these 
two parts of Europe. After the fall of the Soviet Union in the beginning of the 1990s, the 
countries of Eastern Europe had a period of rapid economic liberalization and economic 
globalization. At the same time this led to social disruptions, such as worse living standards 
and increasing unemployment. Theoretically this would be an environment to foster 
nationalistic xenophobia. At the same time Western Europe was shaped by political and 
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economic integration due to the growing European Union.  Based on this discussion about the 
different preconditions in east and west compared to the empirical outcome, it is argued that 
economic globalization is a breeding ground to the rise of xenophobia in Europe since the 
1990s, thus not in the east as predicted, but especially in the west due to the rapid integration.	  
In Eastern Europe it did not foster xenophobia as expected due to the rapid liberalization and 
economic growth and globalization, but did also not help avoid it. (Greskovits 2002, 143ff) 
	  
The big impact of different political and economic conditions is something many scholars 
bring up in the discussion about growing xenophobia.  In the case of east and west Europe 
mentioned here, the author implies that it was expected to see a growing xenophobia in east 
due to the economic changes that occurred. We interpret this as if the indicators of the 
scapegoat theory were expected to bring these negative attitudes in the east, but instead the 
rapid integration in the west led to these negative attitudes.  Further, the author argues that it 
was because of economic globalization, but it can just as well have been because of social 
globalization and a feeling among people that their individual and national identity was 
threatened due to integration. 
	  
Some previous research is pointing in different directions concerning the globalization’s 
effects on attitudes towards immigration. According to Card, Dustman and Preston there are 
two explanations to different attitudes towards immigration policy. The first one is economic. 
The study argue that the better economic condition in a state, xenophobia will not spread due 
to concerns about unemployment etc. The second explanation is the number of immigrants 
living in the state. The study does not state whether more immigrants increase or decrease 
xenophobia, it only points out that theories supporting both directions exist. (Card, Dustman 
& Preston 2005, p.21f) 
	  
Opposed to this argumentation, some scholars argue that economic factors as well as the 
immigrant ratio does not affect xenophobic attitudes. Instead social and psychological factors 
are more relevant and even more important that people often overestimate the number of 
immigrants living in the country (Sides & Citrin 2007, p.500f). Here the two different views 
on how economic factors and the number of immigrants affect attitudes would support 
different theories, but moreover indicates on the importance of contextual factors. As the 
power politicians and the media have on people’s opinion. 
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2.2.4 Short summary of the theoretical framework 
In sum, much research has been done in the field of globalization and attitudes towards what 
is foreign. What can be concluded is that no consensus on what causes xenophobia has been 
reached, and no clear correlation between globalization and the negative attitudes can been 
found in the studies. With other words, none of the hypotheses dependent on the cause of 
xenophobia presented as outcomes when people are exposed to increasing flows of foreign 
people and culture are given support by this discussion of previous research. The same can be 
said about the two main theories on what causes xenophobic attitudes in the first place.  
	  
The focus in previous research has mainly been on the relationship between globalization and 
the concepts of nationalism or migration and not so often on xenophobia as a broader 
concept. This is one of the reasons to our paper, and why we take a broader approach towards 
the concept xenophobia. Moreover, in the previous research it is, as stated before, the level of 
globalization that is used to examine the relationship. This is another reason to our study and 
why we examine the difference in economic and social globalization to see if and how it 
affects the xenophobia in Europe.  
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3. Our study 
	  
To examine the relation between the difference in globalization and the growing level of 
xenophobia we run cross-sectional data regressions on our dependent variable xenophobia, 
that in our case is measured as xenophobic parties’ vote share in the election to the national 
parliament, and the main variable we want to study, that is difference in globalization over 
the time period of 1990 to 2010. This section starts with a critical discussion about problems 
occurring when doing research in this field. Thereafter it presents the data we have chosen to 
measure globalization and xenophobia with, together with an argumentation on why they are 
chosen and how these variables are created. A first step of our analysis is to see if we find any 
relation between xenophobia and the dimensions of globalization. In a second step we present 
and add control variables in our regressions to see if we can learn something more about the 
relations. The control variables are chosen based on the perspectives from the theory section 
and are as follows, difference in unemployment, difference in migration stock, growth in 
GDP/capita and level of education. In a last step we analyze the results of the regressions and 
discuss these within the framework of theoretical perspectives and the empirical situation 
presented in the previous chapter.  
	  
	  
3.1 Critical review 
	  
The two concepts in focus of our study, globalization and xenophobia, are both very complex 
phenomena. They are not only highly dependent of a state’s political, social and economic 
context, both historical and present, and furthermore in an ongoing process of development 
and change. This observation comes with complications. The variables are hard to define and 
measure because of their dependences on situation and context. How and why xenophobia 
grows in a state have specific case-depended reasons, but since we study the global variable 
globalization’s impact on xenophobia we stick to a quantitative analysis of the states and do 
not go deeper in any case with special preconditions. More specific problems with our 
variables are discussed in the following section.  
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3.2 How do we measure the two concepts? 
	  
3.2.1 Globalization 
To measure globalization we use the KOF index on Globalization (Dreher a 2006). It is an 
index that register a country’s level of globalization, and can be used divided in the 
dimensions political- , economic-, and social globalization or put together as an aggregated 
globalization index. The economic dimension include one part of actual economic flows such 
as trade, FDIs and portfolio investments, and one part of restrictions such as trade tariffs and 
hidden import barriers. The social dimension consists of three categories. The first is personal 
contact in forms of direct interaction between people in different states in all possible ways. 
The second is information flows that measure the circulation of ideas, and the third is cultural 
proximity. In the political dimension international cooperation, number of embassies and 
international treaties are counted. (Dreher b 2006) 
	  
We use the KOF index as a measure on globalization since it is the most extensive data on 
states over a long period available. Moreover, it covers the broad concept of globalization 
with many indicators included. In our study we primarily use the dimensions of economic- 
and social globalization since we consider them most relevant in the framework of our 
research question and theory concerning xenophobia. The political dimension is excluded 
throughout the study, since we find the political indicators irrelevant as explaining 
xenophobia from the perspectives explained in our theory discussion. The index on political 
globalization is as stated number of cooperation, treaties and embassies, and we do not find 
that close related to either the economic situation of a state or individual, and furthermore not 
affecting people’s identity. Despite this the dimension of political globalization is still 
included in the cases we use the aggregated globalization data.  
	  
One disadvantage with the KOF index is that it does not include everything connected to 
globalization and is therefore not optimal. As mentioned before, globalization is a complex 
and broad phenomenon, and to measure it is hard. Indicators of all dimensions can have 
different meaning in different countries and its context.  Since we have decided to not 
investigate in country specific contexts and do therefore believe that the KOF index is a good 
measurement for our quantitative study. 
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3.2.2 Xenophobia 
To measure the level of xenophobia in the European states we use the results in parliament 
elections. This data has been collected from the Parliament and Government Composition 
Database (Döring & Manow, 2012) and in some cases from the European Election Database2. 
The measurement of the level of xenophobia in a state is therefore the percentage that 
xenophobic parties gain in the election to the national parliament. This measurement is 
chosen because of the availability over time and its development can therefore be studied and 
compared with other factors.  
	  
As explained in section 2.1.2 we have categorized the different ideologies with close 
relationships, such as racism, under the concept of xenophobia. Due to the fact that 
intolerance today to a large extent focuses on culture and identity, we have chosen to use 
three criteria for which parties to include in the study. Parties included do: 
	  
·   believe that multiculturalism is something bad. 
·   believe that other cultures may undermine one’s own. 
·   believe that immigrants have to adjust and adapt the country’s culture to be 
able to stay. 
 
In harmony with our definition of xenophobia, these criteria include many different parties 
where some are more extreme than others. Still, they all have the fear of other cultures and do 
not believe that different cultures can co-exist in common. To determine if a party meets 
these criteria we have studied academic research and arguments about level of xenophobia in 
different parties, the party’s own position on their official website concerning views on 
immigrants, immigration policy and multiculturalism, and other worldwide media. A list of 
countries, their xenophobic parties and the level of xenophobia in each country is found in the 
Appendix A and B. 
 
One problem with measuring xenophobia as share in parliament elections is that it does not 
catch the growth of non-party xenophobic movements, such as the English Defense League 
(Expo, 2014) and similar movements. It does not cover general accepted norms and attitudes, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The data applied in the analysis in this publication that are based on material from the "European Election 
Database" are collected from original sources, prepared and made available by the Norwegian Social Science 
Data Services (NSD). NSD are not responsible for the analyses/interpretation of the data presented here. 
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towards immigrant as example, which can be more or less negative in different countries. It 
does however give a good guidance about the political power of xenophobic parties. A 
second problem is that it is hard to decide whether a party is xenophobic or not since opinions 
are subjective.  A third factor influencing our choice to measure xenophobia with party share 
in national parliament elections is the actual political system in the specific country. The UK 
as an example has a two party system that makes it hard for smaller parties to establish, but 
this does not mean that there are no xenophobic representatives (Expo, 2014).  
	  
Despite the weaknesses with this measurement of xenophobia, we consider it useful for our 
quantitative study of such a complex phenomenon. Moreover it gives the possibility to 
analyze changes over time. 
	  
3.2.3 The combination of our chosen variables 
We analyze the difference in globalization in the time period 1990-20103, as well as divided 
in 1990-2000 and 2000-2010. The level of xenophobic parties share in national election is 
chosen as close to the last year of the period as possible, maximum three years before or after 
the last year of the period4. The period between 1990 and 2010 is based on the argumentation 
that the era of globalization started around 1990 and that the rise of xenophobia in Europe has 
developed in the beginning of the 21th century. This approach is chosen because of our 
intention that an eventual relation between globalization and xenophobia would come from a 
process where globalization affect people’s minds and opinions, but first after some time 
would it result in pronounced xenophobic attitudes.  
	  
	  
3.3 Can we find a relationship? 
	  
The first step in our study is to see if there is any relationship between the difference in 
globalization after 1990 and the level of xenophobia around 2010. Making simple scatterplots 
on the data, no clear trend can be spotted in the relationship between the difference in 
aggregated globalization between 1990 and 2010 and the level of xenophobia around 2010 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Globalization data on Czech Republic and Slovakia starts in 1993, Estonia and Slovenia starts in 1991. They 
are though included from the year they start. 
	  
4	  For list on parties, election year and level of xenophobia see Appendix A and B.	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more than a vague negative relation, see Chart 1. This negative trend would imply that the 
larger and positive change in globalization is, the lower the level of xenophobia. If we 
remake this procedure after dividing the globalization up in its dimensions social and 
economic globalization the similar results are to be observed, see Chart 2 and 3. 
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When giving the data from KOF index on social and economic globalization for our selected 
observations a closer look, one interesting trend can be observed. Most of the states have a 
negative change in in economic globalization the last years. The measurement of difference 
in economic globalization between 1990 and 2010 does therefore include first an increase and 
thereafter a decrease. The total outcome of this movement is a small increase and this affects 
the results5. This notification is the reason to our choice to divide our period in two parts, 
difference in globalization 1990-2000 with xenophobic level 2000 and difference in 
globalization 2000-2010 with xenophobic level 2010. It is then possible to see if this negative 
trend in the economic globalization during the last period has any impact and change our 
earlier results. Stacked regressions on our data, with a dummy variable equal to zero for the 
first period and equal to one the second period, support this decision. The regressions with 
aggregated and economic globalization have significant dummy variables, even with control 
variables included, while social globalization has insignificant dummy variables6. However, 
since there is significance for the dummy in the first regressions, and because of the visual 
difference looking directly at the data, for both economic and social globalization, the 
continuing parts are focusing on the periods 1990-2000 and 2000-2010. 
 
Looking at the social globalization in the period 1990-2000, see chart 4 below, we find the 
same vague negative relation as before dividing the period up. The same result can be seen in 
the next period with social globalization, see Chart 5. Concerning the economic globalization 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  For	  charts	  on	  differences	  in	  globalization	  between	  the	  two	  periods	  see	  Appendix	  D.	  
6	  For	  tables	  on	  stacked	  regressions	  see	  Appendix	  C.	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the negative relation to xenophobia almost disappears completely in the period 1990-2000, 
see Chart 6. In 2000-2010, see Chart 7, the results with economic globalization slightly 
change and we find two trends. Firstly, the observations have formed two clusters, still with a 
negative but steeper relation to xenophobia, which we can identify as west European states to 
the left and east European states to the right. Secondly, the Western states all have a negative 
difference in economic globalization this period and the Eastern have a positive. This 
observation can be related to Greskovisky’s discussion, mentioned in section 2.2.4, that 
former Soviet Union states had a rapid economic development but not the rise of xenophobia 
that was expected. Still we can see a xenophobic growth in some of the Eastern states, such 
as Hungary and Bulgaria, but not as large as in the west European states. Altogether the 
relationship is stronger than in the whole period of 1990-2010 and do indicate that a declined 
economic globalization does have a relation to xenophobia. 
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We can see a difference between the development of social and economic globalization and 
this indicates that the globalization in general, particularly social, does have a positive effect 
on people’s attitudes towards foreigners and foreign culture. This is one of the different 
approaches Card, Dustman and Preston discusses, see section 2.2.4, and what we can see 
from our results so far closer interaction and integration due to social globalization does lead 
to more understanding and tolerance. At the same time, looking only at the economic 
globalization and how that index is built up, one more relation can be observed. A decrease in 
economic globalization, i.e. something related to the state’s economy or economic structure 
have declined or gone bad, is fostering xenophobic attitudes. This finding supports the fourth 
hypothesis and the scapegoat theory arguing that economic factors have a big impact on 
xenophobia.  
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Our results at this stage conclude that there is a weak negative relation between globalization 
and xenophobia. Most of the perspectives discussed in the theoretical framework support the 
idea that globalization, in one way or another, foster xenophobic attitudes. Even if the size of 
an increase in globalization generally could affect the level in a negative way, specific parts 
of the globalization could still affect xenophobic attitudes in a positive direction, i.e. that 
globalization foster fear for the foreign. Due to our results, a decrease in economic 
globalization during the last years may have had this effect. This would indicate on two 
forces working in different directions, especially during the last decade. The negative changes 
in economic globalization would then support the scapegoat theory and fostering xenophobia, 
while the positive changes in social globalization creates tolerance and prevents xenophobic 
attitudes. Approached from the perspective of our four hypotheses vague support for the first 
and the fourth is found. The next step is to see if we can identify any of these differences with 
help from other indicators.  
 
 
3.4 Can other indicators tell us more?  
	  
3.4.1 Control variables  
To examine if we get a stronger or weaker correlation between the differences in any of the 
types of globalization and the level of xenophobia we run more detailed cross section data 
regressions with control. Due to our limited number of observations we use only a few 
control variables to not get misleading results. The four control variables we run are closely 
related to economic growth and globalization, and according to us relevant in the context of 
xenophobic attitudes. The division of two time periods is used as in the last section. Since we 
want to examine how changes affect xenophobia our control variables are measured in 
differences or growth, except the average school years variable. Changes are used because we 
use the difference in our main variable, globalization, and we find it more relevant to measure 
changes when investigating development in people’s attitudes. As an example, the level of 
unemployment can be high for many years, which according to some theories foster 
xenophobic thoughts. However, a sudden change and increased unemployment may 
according to us affect xenophobia even more. Below the control variables are briefly 
presented and their relevance as indicators of xenophobic attitudes in our study is argued. 
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The first control variable is difference in unemployment of the total labor force in a state. The 
World Bank data on total unemployment ratio of the labor force and the total labor force is 
used to calculate the control variable. (World Bank b, c 2014). According to the scapegoat 
theory and previous research the fear of losing a job due to immigration is sometimes big. If 
this is the case, the unemployment rate, or rather the change in unemployment would be an 
important factor affecting xenophobic attitudes. Moreover, increasing unemployment could 
be a result of an economic crisis or political failure. In combination with increasing social 
globalization and immigration, this would be a reason for people to blame the scapegoat.  
	  
As second control variable the difference in total migration stock of the whole population is 
used. More precisely it is data from the World Bank on the international migrant stock 
(World Bank a 2014), which include the number of people born in a state other than where 
they currently live as well as refugees. The number of immigrants and the migration flow into 
a state would in itself affect xenophobic attitudes in different ways depending on whether the 
underlying reason to these negative attitudes are economic recession or related to the social 
identity. Based on our theoretical discussion both an increased xenophobia, as well as an 
increased tolerance are possible outcomes.  
 
The third control variable is growth in GDP/Capita. Data on GDP/capita (PPP) is taken from 
the Penn World Tables 7.1 (Heston 2012). GDP is a variable frequently used in contexts 
related to economic growth or welfare, and is observed to correlate with globalization. 
According to the scapegoat theory on xenophobia, economic recession is argued to be one of 
the reasons for xenophobic attitudes.  GDP per capita is an indicator able to measure for 
example an economic crisis well. An even better indicator to measure economic changes 
would be the growth rate in GDP/capita. Unlike GDP/capita, the growth rate of GDP/capita 
would directly indicate on the short-term situation without comparing with previous years. 
The lower level or growth rate in GDP would then according to the scapegoat theory indicate 
on more negative attitudes towards immigrants.  
 
The fourth and last control variable used is the level of education in a state. The data used is 
Barro Lee’s data on Average years of total schooling for everyone in the population over 15 
years (Barro & Lee). According to some scholars and surveys there is a correlation between 
higher education and positive attitude towards immigrants (Hainmueller & Hopkins 2013, 
p.18; Card, Dustman & Preston 2005, p.25). This argumentation would yield irrespective of 
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whether xenophobia is based in the scapegoat theory or social identity theory. Moreover, it 
can be argued that higher education decreases fear for losing a job due to immigrants. The 
results of the first European Social Survey implied a strong correlation between higher 
education and positive attitude towards immigrants (Card, Dustman & Preston 2005, p.38). 
	  
The control variables chosen are used in similar studies. As example, in the analysis of the 
results in the first European Social Survey (ESS) on migration and minorities the authors use 
GDP/capita, unemployment level, level of immigrants/foreign born and education as well as 
some more variables, in the regressions trying to explain attitudes towards immigrants (Card, 
Dustman & Preston 2005, p.22ff). Unlike our study, they use the level of immigration and the 
level of all control variables while we are more interested to examine changes in these 
variables and their affection on our dependent variable xenophobia.  
	  
3.4.2 Results 
To continue the analysis started in section 3.3 and its conclusions, this part of the analysis 
continue to use the division of two time periods. Due to the four theoretical hypotheses on 
possible reactions to foreign flows depending on economic and social globalization 
formulated in the theoretical section, the regressions start with social globalization as our 
main independent variable and thereafter economic globalization. Level of xenophobia is still 
or dependent variable and we add the control variables one by one to see how they affect to 
the model.  
 
The first equation with social globalization is as follows, 
 
Xenophobia2000  =  c  +  β1socialglobalization90-00  +  β2unemployment90-00   + β3migration90-00 + 
β4growthGDP/capita90-00  +  β5averageschoolyears2000  +  u 
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Chart 4, in section 3.3, presents the difference in social globalization 1990 to 2000 and level 
of xenophobia year 2000 and implies a vague relationship between the two variables. The 
first regression, displayed in Table 1, supports this by showing us that there is no significant 
relation between the difference in social globalization and the level of xenophobia in the first 
period. The relation is though constantly negative, which corresponds with earlier results and 
indicate that more social globalization would lead to less xenophobia. This would in turn 
support the theoretical discussion that globalization foster tolerance.  
	  
Further we observe that the more control variables we add to the regression, the difference in 
social globalization becomes more significant. The control variables that seem to affect the 
outcome the most are the difference in the migration stock and average school years which 
both are significant when added in the model. The difference in migration stock has a 
negative relationship to the level of xenophobia, which implies that increased migration flows 
would lead to lower levels of xenophobia. Again, this supports the theory that more 
interaction with other cultures fosters tolerance among people. The average school years 
variable is significant and has a negative relation to xenophobia, which supports the theory 
that the more knowledge people acquire the more tolerant they get. In column 5 all variables 
are significant. The growth in GDP/capita variable has a negative relationship with 
xenophobia, while the difference in unemployment has a positive relationship. Approached 
from a scapegoat theory perspective, our interpretation is that as long as people have a 
Table&1
Dependent'Variable:'Xenophobia'2000
Method:'Least'Squares
Included'observations:'30
White'heteroskedasticityAconsistent'standard'errors'&'covariance
Column 1 2 3 4 5
Social&globalization&199052000 A0.395731 A0.439349 A0.598885* A0.616841* A0.873576**
[0.264152] [0.279942] [0.307788] [0.306888] [0.315584]
Unemployment&199052000 0.00000335 0.00000686* 0.00000671 0.00000992**
[A0.0000052] ['A0.00000383] [A0.00000444] [A0.00000474]
Migration&199052000 A0.00000335** A0.00000349** A0.00000503***
[A0.00000126] [A0.00000139] A0.00000144
Growth&GDP/capita&199052000 A0.084645 A0.123790*
[0.071456] [0.071657]
Average&school&years&2000 A3.263174**
[1.468556]
R5squared 0.095553 0.110041 0.184734 0.227580 0.341085
Notes:'Robust'standard'errors'in'parantheses
*'significant'at'10%.'**'significant'at'5%.'***'significant'at'1%
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positive growth in economic terms, or there is no increase in unemployment, there will be 
nothing to blame the scapegoat for.  
	  
In general the model explaining our dependent variable xenophobia can explain the relation 
better the more variables we add. It suggests that the difference in social globalization does 
have an impact on xenophobia.  
 
To see if this result applies in the next period, we use the following equation, 
 
Xenophobia2010 = c + β1socialglobalization00-10 + β2unemployment00-10  + β3migration00-10 + 
β4growthGDP/capita00-10 + β5averageschoolyears2010 + u 
 
 
	  
In the second period we cannot see any clear relation in Chart 5, only that the trend line is 
negative. The same result appears in this regression, see Table 2, where there is no significant 
relation between social globalization and xenophobia. When we add the control variables 
there is no difference, social globalization as well as the control variables are insignificant 
throughout all of the five regressions in Table 2.  
 
Before we analyze the results with social globalization further within the theoretical 
framework we look at the results concerning the economic globalization.  
Table&2
Dependent'Variable:'Xenophobia'2010
Method:'Least'Squares
Included'observations:'30
White'heteroskedasticityBconsistent'standard'errors'&'covariance
Column 1 2 3 4 5
Social&globalization&200042010 B0.16044 B0.170481 B0.196012 B0.15022 B0.157669
[0.235358] [0.242115] [0.266569] [0.295676] [0.310963]
Unemployment&200042010 B0.00000206 0.000000315 B0.000000372 B0.000000239
[0.00000225] [0.00000307] [0.00000262] [0.00000301]
Migration&200042010 B0.00000171 B0.00000199 B0.00000206
[0.00000157] [0.00000153] [0.00000174]
growth&GDP/capita&200042010 B0.074278 B0.070368
[0.063874] [0.067094]
Average&school&years&2010 B0.296508
[2.146027]
R4squared 0.018044 0.032938 0.051334 0.08595 0.086954
Notes:'Robust'standard'errors'in'parantheses
*'significant'at'10%.'**'significant'at'5%.'***'significant'at'1%
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The equation for the period 1990 to 2000 is,   
	  
Xenophobia2000  =  c  +  β1economicglobalization90-00  +  β2unemployment90-00   + 
 β3migration90-00 + β4growthGDP/capita90-00  +  β5averageschoolyears2000  +  u 
 
 
	  
When examining Chart 6 we can see that the relationship is very vague. In Table 3 economic 
globalization is insignificant when being the only independent variable, but adding control 
variables to the model the economic globalization becomes significant with a negative 
relationship to xenophobia. This implies that a larger positive difference in economic 
globalization gives a lower level of xenophobia. Again, this supports the scapegoat theory in 
the way that it indicates a positive economic outcome to decrease the level of xenophobia.  
	  
Both the migration stock and growth in GDP/capita are significant with a negative relation to 
xenophobia. As concluded in the discussion about Table 1 these relationships indicate on an 
increasing flow of migration fostering tolerance, as well as a high growth of GDP/capita 
decreases xenophobia.  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Tabel&3
Dependent'Variable:'Xenophobia'2000
Method:'Least'Squares
Included'observations:'30
White'heteroskedasticityAconsistent'standard'errors'&'covariance
Column 1 2 3 4 5
Economic&globalization&199062000 A0.273197 A0.276253 A0.307233* A0.446476** A0.481827**
[0.163939] [0.164477] [0.165278] [0.174435] [0.181469]
Unemployment&199062000 0.0000012 0.00000263 0.00000253 0.00000307
[A0.00000379] [A0.00000303] [A0.00000327] [A0.00000366]
Migration&199062000 A0.00000179* A0.00000212** A0.00000247**
[A0.000000852] [A0.000000936] [A0.00000101]
Growth&GDP/capita&199062000 A0.129428* A0.148814*
[0.069772] [0.077676]
Average&school&years&2000 A1.406762
[1.404880]
R6squared 0.052971 0.054985 0.079827 0.167009 0.193140
Notes:'Robust'standard'errors'in'parantheses
*'significant'at'10%.'**'significant'at'5%.'***'significant'at'1%
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The equation for the next period is as follows, 
 
Xenophobia2010 = c + β1economicglobalization00-10 + β2unemployment00-10  + β3migration00-
10 + β4growthGDP/capita00-10 + β5averageschoolyears2010 + u 
 
 
 
 
What differs Table 4 from the rest is that it is the only one where globalization, economic in 
this case, as only independent variable is significant (at a 1 % level). This result remains 
when we add the control variables. If we compare Table 3 and 4, economic globalization has 
a negative relation to xenophobia in both tables. We can observe that there is a higher 
significance in Table 4 as well as larger negative coefficients for the economic globalization. 
This implies that economic globalization affects xenophobia more in the second period than 
in the first. As discussed in section 3.3 a majority of the states have a negative or a very small 
difference in economic globalization in the second period compared to the first one, i.e. one 
or several of the indicators of the economic globalization index has decreased. This implies 
that during an economic regression, which may affect the economic globalization in a way 
that it decreases or is idle, the level of xenophobia is affected more by the economic 
globalization than when the economic globalization is strongly positive. 
 
Interesting to note in this regression is that also unemployment is significant when added. 
This significance does though disappear when we add migration, which is significant with a 
negative relation independent on what we add. That the significance of unemployment 
Table&4
Dependent'Variable:'xenophobia_2010
Method:'Least'Squares
Included'observations:'30
White'heteroskedasticityCconsistent'standard'errors'&'covariance
Column 1 2 3 4 5
Economic&globalization&200052010 C0.475857*** C0.558004*** C0.591172*** C0.671856*** C0.697780***
[0.148074] [0.161223] [0.151827] [0.190565] [0.199396]
Unemployment&200052010 C0.0000049*** C0.00000143 C0.00000114 C0.000000725
[0.00000175] [0.00000231] [0.00000231] [0.0000026]
Migration&200052010 C0.0000026** C0.00000249** C0.00000276*
[0.00000115] [0.00000117] [0.00000132]
growth&GDP/capita&200052010 0.058238 0.076202
[0.068798] [0.076043]
Average&school&years&2010 C1.078072
[1.859982]
R5squared 0.254957 0.331635 0.373897 0.389559 0.402832
Notes:'Robust'standard'errors'in'parantheses
*'significant'at'10%.'**'significant'at'5%.'***'significant'at'1%
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disappears may be due to that the two control variables are relative high correlated, 0.7. It is 
not a problem for the regressions but it may be the answer to why it happens. In our model 
migration explain the xenophobia better.  
	  
3.4.3 Viewed from a perspective of our hypotheses 
To shortly summarize the results we have in the regressions found that economic 
globalization has a close relation to the level of xenophobia, and especially in the last period 
where it constantly was significant at a 1% level. Social globalization was significant in the 
first period after adding control variables, and moreover the migration variable showed 
significant results in all regressions except Table 2. This implies that an increased migration 
flow results in lower levels of xenophobia, and that globalization, especially the economic 
dimension, has a negative impact on xenophobia. 
	  
Approaching these results from a perspective of the four hypotheses our study find support 
for hypothesis number 1 and number 4. Hypothesis 1 states that if the difference in both 
social and economic globalization are correlated with the level of xenophobia, we can only 
state that they have an affection on xenophobia, but not really why or support any of the 
theories on what causes these negative attitudes. Since our results tell us that the difference in 
economic globalization is significant in both periods, as well as on a higher level of 
significance, than the difference in social globalization, we also find our results to support the 
fourth hypothesis. It indicates that the difference in economic globalization has a stronger 
effect on xenophobia than the social, which could imply that individuals are more risk averse 
in situations of economic ill. Because of the negative difference in economic globalization in 
the last period and its relation to xenophobia, we argue that our study have a tendency to 
support scapegoat theory.  
	  
With our results in the regressions we do reject the third hypothesis that a high level of social 
globalization would lead to more xenophobic attitudes and in turn support the social identity 
theory. Most importantly we got a negative relation between the two; increasing social 
globalization seems to lead to decreased level of xenophobia. As argued from some scholars 
referred to in our theoretical section of this paper, this result support the theory that social 
globalization fosters tolerance. Furthermore, the control variable difference in migration 
stock has a significant negative relation to xenophobia, both when analyzing the differences 
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in social and economic globalization. This would also support that a growing stream of 
people and culture does foster understanding and tolerance towards the foreign. 
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4. Conclusion  
 
The complexity of the phenomenon of globalization stated in the beginning of this paper can 
once again be noted. In what scale it affects individuals’ way of thinking and their attitudes is 
a perspective that is sometimes forgotten due to the economic growth and wealth it generates. 
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to examine if the change in globalization and its 
different dimensions may be related to the growth of xenophobic parties in Europe during the 
last decades. Based in the theoretical discussion and analyzed through the perspective of four 
hypotheses, our study generates results making it possible to contribute with new 
perspectives within this field of study. 
	  
Our first conclusion is a relationship between the change in globalization and the level of 
xenophobia in Europe the last decades, as the majority of researchers and theoretical 
perspectives argue. Whether the different dimensions of globalization affect these 
xenophobic attitudes in different ways is a more complicated question. To guide and structure 
our study we formulated four hypotheses, whereas the first has already been clarified by our 
first conclusion and the second thereby rejected. We further reject the third hypothesis, that if 
social globalization correlates positively with xenophobia but not with economic 
globalization it suggests that the social identity theory is the main cause to xenophobia. 
Instead of a positive we found a negative relationship, indicating that social globalization 
foster tolerance and positive attitudes towards foreign people. Moreover, our control variable 
difference in migration stock has a significant negative relation in the model, which supports 
this conclusion. This result can still not state that the social identity theory is not relevant; it 
can still be a part of the process and be a force working against the tolerance, a process our 
study cannot notice.  
	  
The fourth hypothesis, that a negative relation between economic globalization and 
xenophobia occurs but not with social globalization which in turn would support the 
scapegoat theory on what causes xenophobia, find vague support in our study. In the last 
period examined, the economic globalization is negatively related to xenophobia no matter 
which control variables we add. At the same time there is no significant relation between 
social globalization and xenophobia during this period. Most interesting is that more than half 
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of the countries had a negative change in economic globalization in our results, which 
indicates for an economic recession or decline in some way, and this would support the 
scapegoat theory even stronger. The economic ill would imply that people find it rational to 
blame this on he growing flow of foreigners. Furthermore, the negative relationship between 
difference in economic globalization and xenophobia is stronger in the second period. This 
implies that when there is an economic recession the economic globalization affects the level 
of xenophobia more than when the economy is growing. An interesting aspect to this finding 
is the difference between the Western and Eastern European states in this case, where the 
Western had the negative change in economic globalization whilst the Eastern had a positive 
change. The difference in these areas’ political and economic situation has been discussed in 
our theoretical chapter, and does together with our results indicate on one of our most 
important conclusions: that the context, political, historical or economic, has a big impact on 
how both xenophobia and globalization can take place and develop and this is something that 
affects both people’s attitudes as well as the results of studies like our own. 
	  
Based on our results we hope this area of study will be elaborated further. We get significant 
results in three out of four time periods and do support, or refute, the previous theories about 
why xenophobia occurs. Nevertheless, this study area can certainly be developed even more. 
For further research we suggest two components that could be developed.  Firstly, as 
mentioned earlier in the paper, we only have 30 observations in our examination because of 
our focus on Europe. Despite this relatively small number of observations we get significant 
results on globalization in three out of four periods. For future research we therefore suggest 
to expand the number of observations to see if the results remain, change or even improve. 
Secondly, we have discussed the problematic when measuring xenophobia. Greater resources 
in time and capacity, or different approaches to measure attitudes like xenophobia could 
improve the research and future studies.   
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6. Appendix 
 
A. Countries, xenophobic level ~2000 and ~2010 and election year 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
Country Xenophobic/level//~2000 Election/yearXenophobic/level//~2010 Election/year
Austria 26,9 1999 20,5 2013
Belgium 11,4 1999 7,8 2010
Bulgaria 0 9,4 2009
Cyprus 0 1,1 2011
Czech8Republic 3,9 1998 0
Denmark 12,4 2001 12,2 2011
Estonia 0 0
Finland 1 1999 19,1 2011
France 11,1 2002 13,6 2012
Germany 1,8 1998 1,5 2009
Greece 0 17,6 2012
Hungary 4,4 2002 16,7 2010
Iceland 0 0
Ireland 0 0
Italy 16 2001 8,3 2008
Latvia 5,4 2002 7,8 2010
Lithuania 1,2 2000 0
Luxembourg 10,5 1999 8,1 2009
Malta 0 0
The8Netherlands 17 2002 15,5 2010
Norway 14,7 2001 22,9 2009
Poland 10,2 2001 1,5 2007
Portugal 0 0
Romania 20,9 2000 3,2 2008
Slovakia 3,3 2002 5,1 2010
Slovenia 4,4 2000 1,8 2011
Spain 0 0
Sweden 0 5,7 2010
Switzerland 26,5 1999 27,9 2011
United8Kingdom 0 0
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B. Countries, parties and websites 
Country	   Party/parties	   Website	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Austria	  
Freedom	  Party	  of	  
Austria	  	   http://www.fpoe.at/	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Belgium	   Vlaams	  Block/Belang	   http://www.vlaamsbelang.org/	  
	  	  
Front/Démocratie	  
National	   http://www.dnat.be/	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Bulgaria	   Ataka	   http://www.ataka.bg/	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Cyprus	   National	  Popular	  Front	  	   http://www.elamcy.com/	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Czech	  Republic	  
Rally for the 
Republic/Republican 
Party of 
Czechoslovakia 	  
http://republikani.webnode.cz/o-­‐
nas/	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Denmark	   Danish	  People's	  Party	   http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Finland	   True	  Finns	  Party	   http://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
France	   Front	  National	   http://www.frontnational.com/	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Germany	   The	  Republicans	   http://www.rep.de/	  
	  	  
National	  Democatic	  
Party	  of	  Germany	   http://www.npd.de/	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Greece	   Golden	  Dawn	   http://www.xryshaygh.com/	  
	  	   Independent	  Greeks	   http://anexartitoiellines.gr/	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Hungary	  
Hungarian	  Justice	  and	  
Life	  Party	   *	  
	  	   Jobbik	   http://www.jobbik.com/	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Italy	   Northen	  League	   http://www.leganord.org/	  
	  	   National	  Alliance	   	  *	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  
	  
Latvia	  
Latvian National 
Independence 
Movement	   http://www.tb.lv/	  
	  	  
	  
 
For Fatherland and 
Freedom	   *	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Lithuania	   Young	  Lithuania	   http://www.jaunalietuviai.lt/	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  
Luxembourg	  
	  
Alternatice	  Democratic	  
Reform	  Party	  
	  
http://www.adr.lu/home/	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
The	  Netherlands	   Pim	  Fortuyn	  List	  	  
http://lijstpimfortuyn-­‐
eindhoven.nl/	  
	  	   Party	  for	  Feedom	   http://www.pvv.nl/	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Norway	   Progress	  Party	   http://www.frp.no/	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Poland	  
Self-­‐Defence	  of	  the	  
Republic	  Poland	   http://www.samoobrona.pl	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Romania	   Greater	  Romania	  Party	   http://prm-­‐central.ro/	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  Romania	  
Romanian	  National	  
Unity	  Party	   *	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Slovakia	   Slovak	  National	  Party	   http://www.sns.sk/	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Slovenia	  
Slovenian	  National	  
Party	   http://www.sns.si/	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Sweden	   Swedish	  Democrats	   http://sverigedemokraterna.se/	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Switzerland	   Swiss	  People's	  Party	   http://www.svp.ch/	  
	  	  
National Action against 
Foreign 
Domination/Swiss 
Democrats	  
http://www.schweizer-­‐
demokraten.ch/aktuell/index.shtml	  
	  	  
Federal Democratic 
Union of Switzerland	   http://www.edu-­‐schweiz.ch/cms/	  
	  	  
Freedom Party of 
Switzerland	   http://www.auto-­‐partei.ch/	  
	  
*For parties without any website. Visit http://detslutnaeuropa.se/lander-2/ for more information.	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C. Stacked regressions with dummy variable 
 
	  
 
	  
 
Aggregated(Globalization(with(Dummy(Variable
Dependent'Variable:'Xenophobia'
Method:'Least'Squares
Included'observations:'60
White'heteroskedasticity@consistent'standard'errors'&'covariance
Column 1 2 3 4 5
Aggregated(globalization @0.486294*** @0.488938*** @0.552603*** @0.534225*** @0.548972***
[0.157117] [0.159602] [0.162397] [0.159978] [0.163393]
Dummy @5.157147** @5.136949* @5.701315** @5.580483** @5.148113**
[2.524738] [2.573001] [2.530294] [2.493201] [2.517949]
Unemployment @0.00000135 0.00000175 0.00000119 0.00000148
[@0.00000235] [@0.00000215] [@0.00000215] [@0.00000229]
Migration @0.00000255** @0.0000027** @0.00000294**
[@0.00000104] [@0.00000109] [@0.00000121]
Growth(GDP/capita @0.063042 @0.061726
[0.047292] [0.048264]
Average(school(years @0.869938
[1.114841]
RAsquared 0.143880 0.148312 0.193872 0.218790 0.228866
Notes:'Robust'standard'errors'in'parantheses
*'significant'at'10%.'**'significant'at'5%.'***'significant'at'1%
Economic'Globalization'with'Dummy'Variable
Dependent'Variable:'Xenophobia'
Method:'Least'Squares
Included'observations:'60
White'heteroskedasticity@consistent'standard'errors'&'covariance
Column 1 2 3 4 5
Economic'globalization @0.397002*** @0.420821*** @0.459948*** @0.438623*** @0.441437***
[0.112479] [0.119998] [0.113691] [0.112858] [0.114012]
Dummy @4.449092** @4.664142** @4.978309** @4.787724** @4.397523*
[2.141583] [2.295688] [2.183273] [2.164505] [2.253001]
Unemployment @0.00000257 0.000000174 @0.000000245 @0.0000000652
[@0.00000209] [@0.00000202] [@0.000002] [@0.00000215]
Migration @0.00000235*** @0.00000247*** @0.00000262**
[@0.000000863] [@0.000000908] [@0.00000102]
Growth'GDP/capita @0.053216 @0.052413
[0.047432] [0.048434]
Average'school'years @0.608163
[1.147650]
RAsquared 0.146631 0.162269 0.201709 0.219212 0.224189
Notes:'Robust'standard'errors'in'parantheses
*'significant'at'10%.'**'significant'at'5%.'***'significant'at'1%
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Social'Globalization'with'Dummy'Variable
Dependent'Variable:'Xenophobia'
Method:'Least'Squares
Included'observations:'60
White'heteroskedasticity@consistent'standard'errors'&'covariance
Column 1 2 3 4 5
Social'globalization @0.270544 @0.267525 @0.344022* @0.324592 @0.370787
[0.178022] [0.179978] [0.204997] [0.214390] [0.237244]
Dummy @1.716247 @1.654382 @2.168426 @2.100636 @1.722528
[2.579670] [2.592868] [2.659522] [2.702195] [2.671964]
Unemployment @0.000000862 0.00000215 0.0000015 0.00000205
[@0.00000234] [@0.00000229] [@0.00000228] [@0.00000252]
Migration @0.0000024** @0.00000255** @0.000295**
[@0.00000112] [@0.00000113] [@0.0000013]
Growth'GDP/capita @0.068360 @0.065910
[0.045210] [0.046651]
Average'school'years @1.138491
[1.234514]
RAsquared 0.050350 0.052159 0.090887 0.120187 0.136397
Notes:'Robust'standard'errors'in'parantheses
*'significant'at'10%.'**'significant'at'5%.'***'significant'at'1%
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D. Differences in globalization
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